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Miles: Sex Offender Registration Statutes

NOTE
JUST DESSERTS, ORA ROTTEN
APPLE?
WILL THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
DECISION IN DOE v. OTTE STAND
TO ENSURE THAT CONVICTED
SEX OFFENDERS ARE NOT
EXCESSIVELY PUNISHED?
A state statute designed to protect the public from
criminals and criminal behavior - no matter how vile
the crime - must comport to constitutional guarantees.
- Judge Nathaniel R. Jones, United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit l

I. INTRODUCTION
Society has determined that released sex offenders are a
class of offenders that must be watched closely by the
community. Whether this determination is right or wrong is
debatable. Nonetheless, every state has enacted sex offender
registration and notification statutes that obligate convicted
sex offenders to comply with an additional commitment after
they have completed their criminal sentences. Although these
statutes may have laudable goals, their punitive effects may
actually outweigh their permissible goals.
Most Circuit Courts of Appeal have applied the multifactor Mendoza-Martinez 2 balancing test when analyzing
1
2

Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 484 (6th Cir. 1999).
See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

Mendoza-Martinez

45
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whether a sex offender registration and notification statute is
so punitive that it violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. 3 One of
the seven Mendoza-Martinez factors, the excessiveness factor,
is the most vague and yet the most important factor in deciding
when a sex offender registration and notification statute
constitutes punishment thereby violating the Ex Post Facto
Clause. The excessiveness factor is examined in terms of what
measures are excessive in relation to the goal of community
protection. This single factor, which is susceptible to varying
interpretations, is applied differently amongst the Circuit
Courts of Appeal. Thus, released sex offenders are impacted to
varying degrees depending on where the sex offender resides.
Some of the excessive requirements, which result in the
unlimited use of often unverifiable and inaccurate information,
have resulted in violent attacks on innocent people and also
extreme measures by residents of communities where the
registered sex offender resides. For instance, a protest in 2000
on the East Coast led to torched cars, neighbors wearing Tshirts with slogans "pervs out" and parents making their young
children in the late hours of the night shout "paedo, paedo"
outside homes of registered sex offenders. 4 Additionally, "lynch
laws" exist in which people suspected of sex offenses have their
houses destroyed by mobs. 5 In one case, an innocent 78-yearold man, who was mistaken for someone else, was one such
person targeted by these "lynch laws."6 Furthermore, Alaska's
Internet database includes the names of all sex offenders, half
of whom are not convicted of offenses against children, and
many of whom are incarcerated and thus do not pose a threat

involved a challenge to the divestment of citizenship to American citizens. Id. at 144.
The respondents challenged the constitutionality of the Nationality Act, 58 Stat. 746,
and § 349 (a)(10)(1940), and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1481
(a)(10)(1954). Id. at 144. The United States Supreme Court held that these two
statutes were punitive and denied due process. Thus the court held that the United
States could not divest the respondents of their citizenship. Id. at 144.
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
4
Tracy McVeigh, Namers and Shamers Face Their Eviction with Pride, Guardian
Unlimited, (Sept. 24, 2000) available at http://www.guardian.co.uklArchive/Article/O,
4273,4067518,00html.
5 Jeevan Vasagar and Julian Glover, Sex Offenders Register, Guardian Unlimited,
(Aug. 3, 2000) available at http://www.guardian.co.uklArchive/Article/0,4043798,
OOhtml.
6 Id.
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to the community. 7 Consequently, databases can lead to
inaccurate information, vigilantism, and excessive punishment
if not used or regulated properly.
Every state has enacted sex offender registration and
notification statutes that obligate convicted sex offenders to
comply with an additional commitment after they have
completed their criminal sentence. S By enacting Megan's Law
in 1994, the United States Congress provided the impetus for
these state statutes. 9 In general, sex offender registration and
notification statutes require convicted sex offenders to register
with local authorities and provide personal information, such
as information concerning their residency and whereabouts.
Local authorities then maintain registries for the purpose of
making this information about convicted sex offenders readily
7 Ala. Dep't of Pub. Safety, Sex Offender Registration Central Registry, available
at http://www.dps.state.ak.us.lnSorcrlhtm/banner.htm.
8 See Carol Kunz, Toward Dispa.ssionate, Effective Control of Sex Offenders, 47 AM.
U.L. REV. 453, 485 (1997). See also, ALA. CODE 13A-11-200 (1994); ALASKA STAT.
12.63.010·.100, 18.65.087 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-3821 to -3824, 411750(B) (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. 12-12·901 to -909 (Michie 1995); CAL.
PENAL CODE 290-290.7 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 18-3-412.5 (Supp.
1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. 54-102r (Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 4120 (1995 &
Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ch. 775.21 (Harrison Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. 42-1-12
(1997); HAw. REV. STAT. 707 to 743 (Michie Supp. 1996) (repealed 1997); IDAHO CODE
18-8301 to 8311 (1997); 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. 150/1 to /10.9 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997);
IND. CODE ANN. 5-2-12-1 to -13 (Michie Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. 692a.1 to .13
(West Supp. 1997); RAN. STAT. ANN. 22-4902 to -4910 (1995 & Supp. 1996); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. 17.500 to .540 (Banks· Baldwin 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 15:540 to :549
(West Supp. 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, 11101-11144 (West Supp. 1996); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, 792B (1996 & Supp. 1997); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 6, 178(c)-(o) (Law
Co-op. 1996); MICH. STAT. ANN. 4.475(1)-(12) (Law Co-op. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN.
243.166 (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. 45-33-1 to -19 (Supp. 1997); Mo. REV.
STAT. ANN. 566-600 to -625 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. 46-23-501 to -508
(1995); NEB. REV. STAT. 29-4001 to -4013 (Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 207.151 to .157
(1995); N.H. REV. STAT. 651-B:1 to -B:9 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:7-1 to :7-11
(West 1995 & Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. 29-11-A-1 to -11-8 (Michie 1997); N.Y.
CORRECT. LAw 168 to 168-v (McKinney Supp. 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. 14-208.5 to .13
(Supp. 1996); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-32-15 (Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2950.01
to .99 (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, 581-587 (West 1991 &
Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. 181.594 to .602 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 97919799.6 (West Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws 11-37.1-1 to -19 (1994 & Supp. 1996); S.C.
CODE ANN. 23-3-400 to -490 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws 22-22-31 to 39 (Michie Supp. 1997); TENN. CODE ANN. 40-39·101 to -108 (Supp. 1996); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-13c.l (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. 77-27-21.5 (1995
& Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,5401-5413 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. 19.2-298.1 to298.4, 19.2-390.1 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9A.44.130-.140
(West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE 61-8F-1 to -10 (1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. 175.45 (West
Supp. 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. 7-19-301 to -306 (Michie 1995).
9
42 U.S.C. §14071 (1994).
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available and accessible to the public. On one extreme, these
statutes serve the interests of public safety. At the other
extreme, these statutes deprive released sex offenders of their
constitutional rights.
Within the last decade, the constitutionality of sex offender
registration and notification provisions has come under heated
attack. This issue will likely continue to be debated among the
legislatures and in the courts due to the widely varying
interpretation of the test applied to these statutes by the
various Circuit Courts of Appeal. The Ninth Circuit and other
Circuit Courts of Appeal have addressed both Ex Post Facto
and Due Process challenges to these laws. To date, the United
States Supreme Court has not weighed in on any of the
challenges to these vastly differing state statutes.
In Doe v. Otte,10 the Ninth Circuit addressed the
constitutionality of Alaska's sex offender registration and
notification statute. ll In finding that Alaska's statute violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Ninth Circuit focused on the
legislature's intent and the statute's punitive effect in deciding
how far a state, and more specifically Alaska, can go to inform
its citizens of the whereabouts of released sex offenders.
The decision of the Ninth Circuit in Doe v. Otte12 is
important especially in terms of what the court considers
excessive, because it varies greatly from the decisions of other
Circuit Courts of Appeal. The Ninth Circuit held that Alaska's
sex offender registration and notification statute was excessive
by allowing dissemination of sex offenders' personal
information over the Internet and requiring in-person
registration four times a year. In contrast, other Circuit
Courts of AppeaF3 have upheld statutes that allow Internet
posting and excessive registration requirements based on the
same Ex Post Facto Clause considerations. As a result, the
Ninth Circuit has opened the door for similar challenges to sex
offender registration and notification provisions from other
states based on the Ex Post Facto Clause.
10 Doe v. Otte, 259 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001), cert granted, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 641
(U.S. Feb. 19,2002) (No. 01·729).
11
Id. The Ninth Circuit did not address the Due Process challenge, but rather
decided the case on the narrower Ex Post Facto issue. Id.
12
Id.
13 Femedeer v. Utah Dep't. of Corr., 227 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000).
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In Part II, this Note outlines the facts and procedural
history of Doe v. Otte. 14 Part III discusses the history of the Ex
Post Facto Clause and Megan's Law, and the varying Circuit
Courts of Appeal approaches to sex offender registration and
notification provisions. Part IV describes the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Doe v. Otte. 15 Part V proposes an alternative to
sex offender registration and notification provisions through
supervised probation. Part V also suggests that supervised
probation will achieve the legislative goal of community
protection without the deprivation of the released sex offender's
constitutional rights. Part VI concludes that the Ninth Circuit
properly held that the Alaska Statute violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause, and suggests that supervised probation is a
better means of accomplishing a balance between the
legislature's goal of community protection and the rights of
released sex offenders.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Rowe v. Burton,16 three plaintiffs, John Doe I, Jane
Doe, and John Doe II, challenged the constitutionality of the
Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act (hereinafter "the Act"),17
under both the United States and the Alaska Constitutions.1 8
The plaintiffs' main challenges to the Act were based on the Ex
Post Facto Clause and privacy rights of the United States
Constitution. 19 The Act required all convicted sex offenders,
even those who were convicted before the statute became
effective, to comply with the Act's requirements. 2o Among
other things, the Act required sex offenders with two or more
convictions to register four times per year with law

Otte, 259 F.3d 979.
[d.
16 Rowe v. Burton, 844 F. Supp. 1372 (1994). Rowe v. Burton was later changed to
Doe v. Otte on appeal. [d.
17 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 4l.
18 Burton, 844 F. Supp. 1372. The plaintiffs filed their claims in the United States
District Court for the District of Alaska. [d. John Doe I initially used the pseudonym
James Rowe, but the court changed his name to John Doe I due to a complaint by a
real James Rowe who suffered harm because his name was easily confused and
associated with the registered sex offender. [d.
19 Burton, 844 F. Supp. at 1375.
20 [d. at 1374·75.
14

15
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enforcement agencies for the remainder of their lives. 21 All
other offenders were required to register four times per year for
a minimum of fIfteen years.22 In addition, the Act provided for
full disclosure to the public of information about all sex
The notification
offenders through a central registry.23
provisions included posting24 sex offenders' home and work
addresses to the public at large with no limitations on who
could obtain the information. 25
John Doe I and John Doe II were both convicted sex
offenders. 26 Jane Doe was married to John Doe I and was not
a convicted or alleged sex offender. 27 John Doe I and John Doe
II pled no contest to the alleged sex offenses in Alaska State
courts. 28 At the time they entered their plea bargains, no sex
offender registration requirements existed. 29
John Doe I
entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of
his daughter in 1985. 30 Upon his release in 1990, the court
made a determination that John Doe I had been successfully
rehabilitated and granted him custody of his daughter. 31 The
court determined that John Doe I was not a pedophile and had
a very low risk of reoffending. 32 Jane Doe, John Doe 1's wife,
alleged that her connection with John Doe I and the
information disseminated about her husband jeopardized her
career. 33
Id. at 1376.
Id.
23 Id.
24
See Otte, 259 F.3d at 981. The Act authorized posing of sex offenders' personal
information over the Internet once the offenders completed their sentence. Id. The
regulations provide that Alaska "will in all cases post the information from the registry
for public viewing in print or electronic form so that it can be used by any person for
any purpose." Id.
25
See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit 13 § 09.050(a) (2000).
26 Burton, 259 F.3d at 1375.
27
Id. at 1387.
28 Id. at 1375.
29 See id. at 1373-75. The Act required convicted sex offenders to register personal
information with law enforcement and authorized public disclosure of the sex offenders'
personal information through a central registry became effective in 1994. Id.
30 See Otte, 259 F.3d at 981. "In 1985, 9 years before the Alaska statue was enacted,
Doe I had entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor after
a court determined that he had sexually abused his daughter while she was between
the ages of 9 and 11. Id.
31
Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. Jane Doe was a registered nurse in Anchorage. Id. She was well known in
the community and alleged that releasing details of her husband's criminal history
21

22
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John Doe II was convicted of sexual abuse of a 14-year-old
child in 1984. He served his time, completed a treatment
program for sex offenders and was released in 1990. John Doe
II did not receive any determination that he had been
rehabilitated. 34
The plaintiffs filed motions seeking a preliminary
injunction and permission to proceed under pseudonyms. 35 The
district court denied the motion to proceed under pseudonyms
holding that the present action "does not warrant anonymity."36
Finally, the court held that the Act did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause because the state had a duty to regulate under
the circumstances for purposes of public safety, and thus the
Act was not punitive. 37 John Doe I, Jane Doe, and John Doe II
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. 38 The Ninth Circuit granted review of the district
court's decision that the Act did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 39
III. BACKGROUND
A. THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE

The Ex Post Facto Clause forbids application of any new
punitive measures to a crime that has already been
adjudicated. 40 The Ex Post Facto Clause offers protection to
those who commit a crime before a law is enacted with the
purpose of prohibiting greater punishment than that allowed at

would interfere with her professional relationships. Id.
34
See id. at 981. John Doe II, entered a plea of nolo contendere on April 8, 1984, to
one count of sexual abuse of a 14·year·old child. Id.
35 Burton, 844 F. Supp at 1385.
36 Id. at 1385·1388. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate "exceptional" circumstances
that would have justified proceeding under pseudonyms since the plaintiffs only sought
to limit the dissemination of facts that were already public. Id.
37 Id. at 1385.
38 Otte, 259 F.3d 979.
39 Id.
40
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, d. 1. See also Dep't of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,
505 (1995) (finding that the decreased frequency of parole suitability hearings for
prisoners violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, quoting Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S.
39, 41 (1937), holding that a charge within statutory requirements cannot increase a
prisoner's sentence to the maximum allowed for offences that took place before the
enactment. To do so would be a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause).
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the time the offense was committed. 41 Fair notice and restraint
of vindictive legislation are the primary goals of the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 42 Thus, before someone can be punished, they
must first have notice of the legal consequences of such actions
and should not be subjected to legislation that aims to punish a
criminal beyond their initial sentence.
To find that a statute, such as the sex offender registration
and notification statute, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, a
court must first determine that the effects of the statute are
punitive. 43 Only statutes that are punitive violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 44 If a sex offender registration and notification
statute is not punitive, then it is merely regulatory and meant
to balance the needs of public safety against the privacy of the
convicted sex offender. 45
To determine whether a law is punitive, a court must
analyze both the legislature's intent and the effect of the
legislation under the intent-effects test. 46 Under this test, if
the legislature's intent is clearly regulatory rather than
punitive, then the burden falls on those challenging the law to
submit the "clearest proof that the punitive effects negate the
state's regulatory intent."47 In order to determine the extent of
41
See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798). (Holding that a state can pass new
laws without creating and Ex Post Facto violation since the law was not meant to
punish).
42 See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981).
The Supreme Court held that a
statute enacted after defendant's sentence pertaining to credits for time served did not
pertain to the defendant because the law cannot be applied retrospectively in violation
of the Ex Post Facto Clause. [d.
43 See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144.
44 [d. at 168-69.
45
See Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997). This case involved a
convicted sex offender's challenge to Washington's Community Protection Act, WASH.
REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (1997) based on the Ex Post Facto Clause and privacy and due
process challenges. [d. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the registration and
notification provision of the statute were constitutional because the legislature did not
indent the act to be punitive and did not support the fining that the act was excessive
in relation to the regulatory goal of community protection. [d.
46 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
Supreme Court's holding that
Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act, RAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29aOI et seq. (1994),
satisfied substantive due process requirements. [d.
47 See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144. This test came as a result of the United
States Supreme Court decision that a United States citizen could not be divested of
citizenship under the Nationality Act, 58 Stat. 746 (1940), and the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1481 (a)(IO) (1952), because the statutes used to divest
citizenship were unconstitutional. [d. The Supreme Court concluded that the statutes
were punitive and did not provide for due process. [d.
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the statute's punitive effects, courts usually rely on an
examination of the Mendoza-Martinez balancing test in
weighing the legislative purpose against the punitive effects.48
Courts generally use the Mendoza-Martinez test to
determine whether the effects of the law are punitive to such a
degree that the punitive effect outweighs the legislative intent
of public safety.49 This is the traditional test used for
distinguishing regulatory from punitive measures. 50 Under the
Mendoza-Martinez test, the court balances seven factors, in
light of the language used in the statute and the statute's effect
on the offender, to determine whether the statute is punitive. 51
Those factors are:
(1) Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint;
(2) Whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment;
(3) Whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
(4) Whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment - retribution and deterrence;
(5) Whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime;
(6) Whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable to it; and
(7) Whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned.
If the punitive effects of the statute are "excessive and
beyond that necessary to promote public safety" the court will
find that the statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. 52

B. MEGAN'S LAW
In 1994, Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl, was abducted
raped and murdered near her home in New Jersey.53 Jesse
Timmendequas, the man convicted for the crimes, was
previously convicted of two other sex offenses involving two
48

Id.

See generally, Roe v. Office of Prob., 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997), Cutshall v.
Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999), Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2000),
and Russell v. Gregorie, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2000).
60 See Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
51 See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 101 (1997).
52 Kansas v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996).
53 J.F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 1994, at Bl.
49
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young girls. 54 No one in Megan's community was aware of
Timmendequas's history of sex offenses. 55
Within three months of Megan's death, the New Jersey
legislature enacted Megan's Law, known as the Registration
and Community Notification Law. 56 This was the first sex
offender registration and notification provision of its kind in
the United States. 57 Its purpose was to alert the community to
the presence of sex offenders and therefore, promote the safety'
of the community.58
Megan's Law requires sex offenders, who have completed
their sentences for certain designated offenses, to register with
local police departments. 59 Registration is only to occur if the
sex offenders' conduct at the time of sentencing was to be
"characterized by a pattern of repetitive and compulsive
behavior."60
Megan's Law also created a registration
requirement and a three-tiered notification program. 61
Additionally, Congress made the implementation of state sex
offender registration and notification provisions a prerequisite
for receiving certain federal funds. 62
Currently, all states have enacted their own versions of
Megan's Law. 63
Many Circuit Courts of Appeal have
interpreted these laws broadly, imposing restrictions on
released sex offenders, thus allowing punishment to continue

[d.
[d.
66 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (1994).
67 J.F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1 1994, at B1.
54

66

68

[d.

[d. The law enforcement agencies can release "relevant and necessary
information concerning registrants when ... necessary for public protection."
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-11 (1994).
61 See id. Three categories, Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 correspond to either a low,
moderate, or high risk of recidivism. [d. Under Tier 1, the lowest risk category,
prosecutors must notify law enforcement agencies within the sex offenders' vicinity or
other agencies likely to encounter the sex offender. [d. Under Tier 2, the moderate risk
category, community organizations involving the care of children, such as schools, are
notified. [d. Under Tier 3, the high-risk category, law enforcement agencies must
notify the public if they are likely to encounter these sex offenders. [d.
62 See 42 U.S.C. § 14071.
The Jacob Wetterling Act was established to provide
information to the community where a sex offender resides, not to the world at large.
[d. Further, the Jacob Wetterling Act affords due process protections such as tier
classifications based on the risk of recidivism. Id.
63 See supra note 12. The Ninth Circuit did not address the Due Process challenge,
but rather decided the case on the narrower Ex Post Facto issue. [d.
59
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after the released sex offender has completed his sentence. 64
Other states, most notably Washington, have narrowly
interpreted the language of Megan's Law and have made an
effort to balance the needs of society against the needs of the
sex offender. 65
C. VARYING APPROACHES TO SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION STATUTES BY
CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL
Various Circuit Courts of Appeal have interpreted the
Mendoza-Martinez excessiveness factor and have applied the
sex offender registration and notification statutes in widely
varying ways. Some Circuit Courts of Appeal allow the
dissemination of a sex offender's personal information over the
Internet,66 while other Circuit Courts of Appeal hold that this
type of dissemination is excessive, and therefore, violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause. 67 The varying interpretations and
applications of sex offender registration and notification
provisions evidence the fact that this system may not be the
best way of ensuring uniform attempts at public safety because
this system results in the violation of released sex offenders'
constitutional rights.
1. Ninth Circuit

a. Russell v. Gregoire
In Russell v. Gregorie,68 the Ninth Circuit addressed the Ex
Post Facto Clause and Due Process challenges to Washington's
Community Protection Act. 69 The provisions of this statute
imposed registration requirements on all sex offenders,
regardless of date of conviction, and subjected some to

64 See Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997), Femedeer v. Utah Dep't of
Corr., 227 F.3d (10th Cir. 2000), Roe v. Office of Adult Prob., 125 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1997)
and Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999).
65 See Russell, 124 F.3d 1079.
66 See Femedeer, 227 F.3d 1244.
67 See Otte, 259 F.3d 979.
68 Russell, 124 F.3d 1079. The majority decision was written by Judge O'Scannlain.

Id.
69

Id.
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community notification.7° The statute applied to sex offenders
found guilty as well as those found not guilty by reason of
insanity.71 The release of personal information about a sex
offender under the notification provision was limited to the
release of information to persons living in the general vicinity
of the offender's residence. 72 Further, the statute provided for
a tiered system of classification based on the nature of the
initial offense and the likelihood of recidivism. 73
Willie Russell and Johnny Sterns were both convicted of
sex related offenses in 1989. 74 Both were imprisoned and
released. 75
The Washington legislature enacted the
Community Protection Act in 1990,76 and amended the statute
in 1994, 1995 and 1996. 77 Each amendment increased the
registration requirements imposed on sex offenders. Initially,
the registration requirements were minimal and subjected
some only to community notification. 78 Later, the statute was
broadened to include specific requirements imposing time
frames within which a sex offender had to register new
addresses and included penalties for non-compliance. 79 Thus,
Russell and Sterns claimed that the statute violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause because the statute's requirements increased
the initial punishment imposed at sentencing. 80
The Ninth Circuit considered the registration and
notification provisions separately. The court first looked at the
intent of the statute. Mter analyzing the statutory language,
the court held that the legislature meant to regulate, not to
punish. 81 The expressed intent underlying the legislation was
to monitor the whereabouts of sex offenders for the purpose of
Id. at 1082·83.
Id. at 1082.
72 Id. at 1082·83.
73 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082.
Level one offenders were not subject to public
notification. Id Level two offenders were subject to notification by government to law
enforcement agencies and schools. Id. Level three had the same notification
requirements but this information was also provided to local news media. Id.
74 Id. at 1081.
75 Id.
76 Washington Community Protection Act § 9A 44.130(1).
77 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1081.
See Washington Community Protection Act § 9A
44.130(1).
78 Washington Community Protection Act § 9A 44.130(1).
79 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1087.
70
71
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public safety, not to impose additional punishment upon their
release. 82
Since the legislature's intent was clearly regulatory, the·
court considered whether there was the clearest proof that the
punitive effects of the statute outweighed the legislative goal of
community protection. The court analyzed the MendozaMartinez factors and found that none of the factors supported
the conclusion that the effects of the Act were punitive. 83 The
court found no affIrmative disability or restraint, found the
registration aspect to be regulatory, found that the statute did
not serve retributive purposes and found that the statute was
not excessive in relation to the state's interest of public
protection. 84 The court concluded that the statute's punitive
effects were "not so egregious as to prevent us from viewing the
Act as regulatory or remedial."85 Further, the court noted that,
"the harsh results of notifIcation come not as a result of
government action, but as a societal consequence of the
offender's crime."86
b. Neal v. Shimoda

In Neal v. Shimoda,87 A. J. Neal and Marshall Martinez
claimed that Hawaii's sex offender treatment program violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause. 88 The Ninth Circuit's decision in this
case expanded the application of sex offender registration
statutes to those who have never been convicted of sex related
offenses.
Hawaii's guidelines for the treatment program
resulted from the legislature's conclusion that "sexual assault
is a heinous crime committed by offenders with deviant
behavior patterns that cannot be controlled by incarceration
alone."89
In 1993, Neal was charged with sex offenses, but those
charges were dismissed when he entered a plea agreement
82 Id.
sa Id. at 1089. The court compared the statute's registration requirements to those
in other statutes which have been found to be constitutional by other courts. Id.
B4 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089.
B5 Id. at 1092.
B6 Id. at 1092.
87 Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997).
BB Id. at 821.
89 See id., citing 1992 HAW. SESS. LAws 304-305.
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based on other related non-sexual charges. 9o Although Neal
was never convicted of any sex related offenses, he was
classified as a sex offender during his incarceration in order to
allow him to ''benefit from sex offender treatment."91
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the narrowly
constructed statute was not excessive in relation to the goal of
community protection, was constitutional and thus did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 92 This decision provided the
basis for comparison in Doe v. Otte93 and cases in other Circuit
Courts of Appeal in regards to what requirements in a sex
offender registration and notification are permissible.
Martinez had two prior sex related offenses and was
previously convicted of attempted rape and kidnapping. 94
Martinez was sentenced to a prison term and became eligible
for parole in 1998. 95 Martinez was classified as a sex offender,
but refused to participate in the prison's treatment program. 96
Neal and Martinez brought separate claims challenging
the treatment program under the Ex Post Facto Clause, on the
basis that the policy under which they were classified and
treated as sex offenders was created after they were
convicted. 97 Both claimed that the classification made them
ineligible for parole and imposed an additional punishment,
thereby violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. 98
Judge Nelson wrote the majority opinion for the Ninth
Circuit, with Judge Reinhardt dissenting. Judge Nelson relied
on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Kansas v.
Hendricks,99 which held that the prison's classification system

90 See Neal, 131 F.3d at 822.
Neal was charged with sexual assault in the flrst
degree, terrorist threats and attempted murder. Id. Neal was not found guilty of
sexual assault, but rather plead to terrorist threats and attempted murder in exchange
for the dismissal of the sexual assault charge. Id.
91 Id. at 822.
92 Id. at 1093.
93 Otte, 259 F.3d 979.
94 Id. at 822-23.
95 Id. at 823.
96
Id.
97 Neal, 131 F.3d at 823.
98 Id. at 821. The two cases were consolidated for the appeal to the Ninth Circuit
because of the similarity in Neal's and Martinez's claims. Id.
99 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 346.
This case upheld Kansas's Sexually Violent
Predator Act which implemented involuntary civil commitment for sex offenders likely
to re-offend and declared these individuals to be sexually violent predators. Id.
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in Kansas did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.1°o Judge
Nelson held that the mandatory treatment programs did not
constitute punishment because of their rehabilitative
purpose. 101 He rationalized the denial of parole to Neal and
Martinez under the classification as necessary for them to
complete the treatment program. 102
Judge Reinhardt dissented, stating that the classifications
did violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 103 He noted that the
delay in parole eligibility resulted in substantially adverse
effects on those to whom the program applied. 104 He concluded
that the terms and conditions of Neal's and Martinez's parole
dates were unlawfully changed by the application of the sex
offender treatment program's provisions and thus violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause. 105 In reaching that conclusion, Judge
Reinhardt noted that the most glaring error in the majority's
opinion, especially in Neal's case, was that a court never
determined that he was a sex offender.1 06
Judge Reinhardt was also distressed by the Hawaii's
prison officials' practice of basing the classifications on past
acts rather than on the current threat of the inmate. 107 The
distinguishing feature between the Kansas and Hawaii
statutes is that the Kansas statute provided for rehabilitation
through a long-term treatment program for sex offenders and
segregated them from the general prison population for
purposes of treatment.
In contrast, Hawaii's statute is
excessive because it maintains sex offenders in the general
population and imposes additional punishment through denial
of parole and extended incarceration. lOB
While the Mendoza-Martinez factors were not specifically
applied in this case, the majority's central focus was on
whether the statute was excessive. Thus, the Ninth Circuit in
Russell1 09 and Neal llo came to differing conclusions. The Act in
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Neal, 131 F.3d at 825.
[d. at 827.
[d.
[d. at 834.
[d. at 834-35.
Neal, 131 F.3d at 834-35.
[d. at 835.
[d.
[d. at 835-36.
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079.
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Russell lll was upheld based on the statute's narrow
construction which limited the requirements imposed on the
released sex offender. To the contrary, the sex offender
treatment program in Nea11l2 was upheld even though it was
broadly constructed and expanded the state's powers to
continue to punish under the guise of a sex offender
registration and notification statute. Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Neal 113 has broadened the state's powers
beyond the dictates of Megan's law, while Russell 114 set clearer
and more limited parameters on the reach of sex offender
registration and notification requirements.
2. Tenth Circuit
In Femedeer v. Utah Department of Corrections,115 the
Tenth Circuit examined the constitutionality of Utah's sex
offender registration and notification statute. 116 Femedeer
challenged the constitutionality of Utah's statute under the Ex
Post Facto Clause.1 17
The Tenth Circuit analyzed whether the legislature
intended to create a civil remedy or a criminal penalty.1 18 The
court analyzed the placement of the statute in the civil code,
rather than criminal code, and concluded that this was
evidence of the legislature's nonpunitive intent. 119 Further, the
court held that access to information over the Internet was to
furnish the general public with easy access to information to
enable citizens to assist with police investigations. 12o The
Neal, 131 F.3d at 818.
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079.
112 Neal, 131 F.3d at 818.
113 [d.
114
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079.
115 Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1244.
116
See id. In 1998, Utah amended its sex offender registration and notification
statute to apply to all convicted sex offenders regardless of date of conviction and
eliminated all geographic restrictions on the notification provision. [d. The increase in
the number of requests for information about registered sex offenders, specifically
100,000 requests from Boy Scouts of America checking into the background of its
volunteers, created a backlog. [d. To remedy this problem, the Department of
Corrections allowed unlimited access to information through its website. [d.
117 [d. at 1246.
118 [d. at 1248-49.
119 [d. at 1249.
120 Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249.
110

111
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Tenth Circuit found that Internet notification was "clearly a
civil remedy."121 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the legislature intended to protect the public rather than to
punish. 122
Since the Tenth Circuit concluded that the legislature had
an unambiguous, nonpunitive intent, the court examined
whether Femedeer had shown the "clearest proof' that the
punitive effects outweighed the legislature's regulatory
intent. 123 In doing so, the court relied on the MendozaMartinez factors.124
First, the Tenth Circuit found that the statute did not
impose an affirmative disability or restraint because
registrants were free to choose a place to live and work and
were "free to come and go as they please."125 The court found
that Utah's statute, like Washington's statute, imposed no
affirmative disability,126
Unlike the Washington statute,
however, which provided information in only specified
geographic areas, the Utah statute provided information about
registered sex offenders worldwide,127 Further, the Tenth
Circuit determined that access to unlimited information about
convicted sex offenders over the Internet is not analogous to
public shaming and thus does not equate with historical
punishment,128 The court emphasized that the information
released was true and accurate. 129
Although the court
acknowledged that allowing access to such information has
"substantial negative consequences involved," nevertheless, it
has never been regarded as punishment. 13o
Next, the court found that application of Utah's statute
was not dependent on the finding of scienter because all sex
offenders, whether convicted or committed to mental
institutions for their crimes, were subject to the registration

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1249-50.
Id.
Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250.
Id. at 1250.
See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1089.
Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1250-51.
Id. at 1251.
Id.
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and notification provisions. 131
The court was unable to
determine whether the statute promoted retribution and
deterrence, the traditional aims of punishment, and held that
this
element of the
Mendoza-Martinez
test
was
"inconclusive."132 Although the court acknowledged that the
statute applied to behavior that was already a crime, it did not
give much weight to this factor. Rather, the court concluded
that the statute's purpose was to prevent future crime,
specifically sex offenses. 133
Thus, the civil, non -punitive
purpose of promoting public safety outweighed the statute's
application to behavior already deemed criminal. l34
Finally, the court considered the excessiveness factor. The
court acknowledged that the negative impact of disseminating
information over the Internet- was great. The court, however,
was confident that few inquiries would be made since "the
farther removed one is from a sex offender's community ... the
less likely one will be to have an interest in accessing this
particular registry."135 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the statute was not excessive in relation to its public safety
goals, and therefore, did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. 136 Thus, the Tenth Circuit expanded the scope of
limited community notification provided for by Megan's Law, to
include world-wide access to a registered sex offender's
personal information over the Internet.
In upholding Utah's sex offender notification scheme,
Tenth Circuit dealt a crushing blow to Due Process and Ex Post
Facto rights for convicted sex offenders. Thus, the Tenth
Circuit has broadened sex offender registration and notification
prOVISIOn to the greatest extent by concluding that
dissemination of sex offenders' information worldwide, over the
Internet, is an appropriate avenue for assuring public safety
and was not excessive punishment.

131
132

133

[d. at 1252.
[d. at 1251-52.
Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1252.

[d.
[d. at 1253.
136 [d.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision which found the
statute unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause. [d. Note that this is the
exact opposite holding from Otte, which concluded that unlimited access to information
over the Internet is excessive and thus punitive. [d.
134

135
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3. Fifth Circuit

In Moore v. Avoyelles Correctional Center,137 the Fifth
Circuit closely followed the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Russell. 138 Moore contended that Louisiana's sex offender
statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause by subjecting him to
a sex offender registration and notification law that was
enacted after he was convicted of indecent behavior with a
minor.1 39 Moore's five-year prison sentence was suspended and
Moore was placed on probation. 140 One of the conditions of his
probation required him to register as a sex offender. 14l
The Fifth Circuit applied the intent-effects test used in
Russell 142 and compared Louisiana's statute to other states'
statutes, including those in Washington and Connecticut. The
court concluded that Louisiana's statute did not impose
punishment and was not excessive to the extent that it violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause.1 43 The court found that the language
of Louisiana's statute closely mirrored the language of the
Washington statute. Therefore, the legislature's intent was
clearly to protect the public from recidivist sex offenders. 144
Without applying the seven factors from the MendozaMartinez effects test, the Court concluded that Moore failed to
satisfy the clearest proof standard because he failed to show
that the statute was so punitive or excessive that it outweighed
the legislature's non-punitive intent. 145 Thus, this decision is
in line with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Russell by holding
that if the statute is narrowly construed then it will not be
considered excessive or punitive under the Ex Post Facto
Clause.

Moore v. Avoyelles Corr. Ctr, 253 F.3d 870 (5th Cir. 2001).
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079.
139 Moore, 253 F.3d at 871.
140 [d.
141
See id. A condition of Moore's probation was a requirement that he register his
personal information with law enforcement. [d. The statute required released sex
offenders to notify their neighbors of their residence and sex offender status. [d.
142 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079.
143 Moore, 253 F.3d at 872-73.
144 [d. at 873.
145 [d. at 872-73.
137

138
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4. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit, in Roe u. Office of Adult Probation, 146
considered an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to an internal
sex offender notification policy of a Connecticut state agency,
the Probation Department. 147 The issues before the court were
whether the agency policy should apply to those sex offenders
whose crimes took place before the enactment of the policy and
whether the policy constituted punishment. 148 Thus, the court
addressed the constitutionality of the probation department's
sex offender notification policy on Ex Post Facto grounds. 149
Roe was convicted of six counts of sexual assault against a
minor in 1991.1 50 He was released on parole in August 1994. 151
In approximately November 1994, Roe's parole was revoked
and he was returned to prison. 152 He was released again and
placed on probation in 1995, at which time the probation
department concluded that Roe had a high rate of reoffending. 153
The agency policy allowed for public notification of the sex
offenders' criminal records while under the supervision of a
probation officer.1 54 Prior to the implementation of the Adult
Probation Sex Offender Notification Policy, Connecticut's
legislature enacted a sex offender registration scheme in 1994,
that only applied to those persons convicted of seven specified
offenses after January 1, 1995.155 In 1995, the statute was
broadened to provide for notification to specific people in the
registrant's vicinity.1 56 In 1997, the statute was broadened
again, requiring all sex offenders to comply with the

Roe, 125 F.3d 47.
Id. at 48. Considering sex offender notification through an internal state agency
policy rather than the implementation through a Connecticut statute. Id.
148 Id. Police, victims, victim's parent and guardian received information about sex
offenders' change of address or changed in conditions of probation. Id.
146

147

149
150

Id.
Id. at 51.

151

Roe, 125 F.3d at 51.

152

Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 47.

153

154
155

156 Roe, 125 F.3d at 49. The sex offenders' personal information could be disclosed to
"'any specific person if such disclosure is deemed necessary by the chief of police ... to
protect said person from any person subject to' "registration. Id.
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registration requirements regardless of conviction date and
authorizing unlimited notification. 157
In analyzing whether the policy was punitive, the Second
Circuit used the intent-effects analysis. 158 The court noted that
the Probation Department's primary intention was to protect
the public from the sex offenders under its supervision and to
aid in their rehabilitation. 159 The court also found that the
policy was regulatory, rather than punitive.1 60 In applying the
clearest proof standard, the court determined that any punitive
effects of the policy were outweighed by the policy's goals of
community protection. 16l Although the district court applied
the Mendoza-Martinez test and determined the policy was
punitive, the Second Circuit applied the Mendoza-Martinez
factors and decided that the policy was not punitive based on
the same criteria. 162 The Second Circuit held that Roe failed to
establish the clearest proof that the notification policy was
punitive. Further, the court held that the policy was "not
excessive in relation to its purpose of enhancing public
awareness and helping to prevent the recovering offender from
harmful relapses."163
The Second Circuit in Roe v. Office of Adult Probation 164
upheld the constitutionality of the internal state policy
provision, despite the retroactive application of the provisions
to sex offenders.
Clearly, the Second Circuit's decision
evidences the trend to broaden sex offender registration and
notification provisions to apply to those whose crimes took
place before the statute was enacted.
5. Sixth Circuit

In Cutshall v. Sundquist,165 the Sixth Circuit reviewed the
Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act1 66

157
158
159
160
161
162

163
164

165

168

Id. at 49·50.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id.
Roe, 125 F.3d at 54-55.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Roe, 125 F.3d at 47.
Cutshall, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-101 - 40-39-110 (2001).
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which required released sex offenders to register with law
enforcement agencies and allowed the information to be
disseminated to the public. 167
Cutshall challenged the
constitutionality of the registration and notification provisions
of the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring
Act, arguing that the sex offender registration and notification
provisions violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 16s
The Act required Cutshall to register personal information
with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation following discharge
from incarceration. 169
Further, the Act authorized the
maintenance of a registry for law enforcement to keep track of
sex offenders.1 70 Cutshall claimed these provisions punished
him twice for the same offense, and alleged that the legislature
intended to further punish sex offenders in addition to their
sentences of incarceration, through the Act.1 71 He also argued
that the maintenance of the central registry did not serve the
state's alleged purpose of aiding law enforcement, but rather
that the effects of the registry were punitive.1 72
In Cutshall,173 the district court had found that the
registration provision was constitutional. The court, however,
found that the notification provision violated Cutshall's
constitutional right to Due Process. The court reasoned that
Cutshall was denied an opportunity to challenge the
dissemination of the information that he was required to
provide to the central registry.174
The Sixth Circuit analyzed Cutshall's Ex Post Facto
Clause and Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy challenges
simultaneously, upholding the district court's Ex Post Facto
determination, but reversing on Due Process grounds.1 75 First,
the court looked at the intent behind the Tennessee Act.176
Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 469.
Id. Cutshall also argued that the registration and notification provisions also
violated other constitutional violations such as substantive and procedural due process,
right to privacy. and equal protection Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171
Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 472.
172 Id.
173 Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 1079.
174 Id. at 469.
175 Id. at 474.
176 Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 4039-101 - 40-39-110 (2001).
167
168
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Mter analyzing the language of the statute, the court
concluded that the statute was regulatory in nature since the
intent underlying the statute was to assist law enforcement
and to protect the public.1 77
Next, the Sixth Circuit analyzed the effects of the statute
under the Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine whether the
punitive effects significantly outweighed the regulatory intent
so as to constitute punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto
Clause.1 78 The court found that the statute did not impose any
restraint on registrants because they were not incarcerated,
did not lose their livelihood, and were not deprived of a driver's
license like those convicted of less serious crimes.1 79 The court
also noted that registration and notification requirements did
not constitute historical punishment because they did not
impose imprisonment, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. 180
Application of the Tennessee Act did not depend on the finding
of scienter because the statute did not require a cUlpable mens
rea. 181 The court found that the statute probably served
traditional aims of punishment, such as deterrence, but stated
that this was not dispositive of the punitive nature of the
statute. 182 Although the statute applied to acts that were
already crimes, the court found that the statute was still more
regulatory than punitive. 183 Finally, the court combined the
last two Mendoza-Martinez factors and determined that the
statute's requirements were minimal in comparison to the
benefit from regulation. 184
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Jones stated that, "a state
statute designed to protect the public from criminals and
criminal behavior - no matter how vile the crime - must
comport with constitutional guarantees."185 Judge Jones was
primarily concerned with the denial of due process based on the
Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 474.
[d. at 474·477. The court applied the clearest proof standard because it
determined that the statute's intent was regulatory based on the limited disclosure, the
intent to protect the public, and the minimal reporting requirements.
179 [d. at 474.
180 [d. at 475.
181 [d. The statute applied to those found guilty of a sex related offense as well as
those found not guilt by reason of insanity. [d.
182 Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 475.
183 [d.
184 [d. at 476.
185 [d. at 484.
177

178
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fact that the statute treated all offenders alike, regardless of
the severity of the crime or the risk of recidivism. 186 Thus,
when a statute fails to categorize according to the severity of
the crime, the offender's threat to the public cannot be
accurately determined. 187 If the primary aim of the law is to
protect the public, an offender must have the right to a court's
determination of the likelihood of recidivism before the offender
is required to register. 188
The Sixth Circuit concluded that Tennessee's sex offender
registration statute was not punitive and, therefore, did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 189 This decision did not
broaden the dictates of Megan's Law, but did validate the
actions taken by the state to control released sex offenders.

6. Eight Circuit
In Burr v. Snider,190 Burr claimed that North Dakota's sex
offender registration statute,19l which required address
registration by convicted sex offenders, imposed an excessive
punishment on a released sex offender.1 92 Burr pled guilty to
violating this statute when he failed to notify the police of his
new address. 193 He claimed that the statute improperly
authorized dissemination of sex offender information to the
public.
Burr further argued that this dissemination of
information constituted punishment that was not imposed at
the time the offender was originally sentenced, and thus
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. 194
The Eight Circuit first analyzed the statute under the
intent-effects test. 195 The court examined the legislative
history of the statute and concluded that the legislature did not
intend the registration requirement to constitute a punitive

Id.
Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 484.
188 Id.
189 Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 466. The court also found the statute constitutional under
the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy. Id.
190 Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2000).
191 N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1·32·15(3) (1999).
192 Burr, 234 F.3d at 1052.
193 Id. at 1053.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1054.
186
187
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measure. 196 The court based its conclusion on the lack of
evidence that indicated that the registration requirement was
being used to punish. 197 The court found that the legislature
did not intend to increase the offenders' initial penalty, and
therefore, did not intend to punish. 19B
Next, the court considered whether the statute was
punitive under the Mendoza-Martinez effects test.1 99 Taken as
a whole, the court stated that any punitive effects of the statute
were not outweighed by the legislature's intent to protect
communities from convicted sex offenders. 20o Furthermore, the
court found that the statute did not impose an affirmative
disability or restraint, did not promote the traditional aims of
punishment, but did further the legitimate interest of public
protection. 201 The court, however, failed to substantiate the
claim that these provisions actually protect the community.
Accordingly, Burr202 has also followed the nationwide trend of
upholding sex offender registration and notifications statues
under the guise of community protection.
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held that North Dakota's
sex offender registration statute, which required sex offenders
to notify police upon changing their residence, did not
constitute punishment under the Ex Post Facto Clause. 203 The
court found that requiring sex offenders to keep police informed
of their whereabouts when they move was not excessively
punitive. 204 The penalty imposed for violation of this provision,
according to the Eighth Circuit, did not create an additional
punishment in relation to the original sentence, and therefore
did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Thus, this case is in
line with the dictates of Megan's Law and has validated the
196 Id.
See also Burr v. Snider, 598 N.W. 2d at 152-53 (1998). The Eight Circuit
looked to the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision for guidance on the statue's
legislative history. Burr, 234 F.3d at 1052.
197 Burr, 234 F.3d at 1054.
198 Id.
199 Id.
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the statute was not punitive
under the Mendoza-Martinez effects test.
Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit
acknowledged that this test "usually involves a certain degree of judicial discretion."
Id.
200 Id.
201 Id. Thus, the Eighth Circuit found that the North Dakota Supreme Court's
analysis was reasonable under the facts of this case. Id.
202 Id.
203 Burr, 234 F.3d at 1055.
204 Id.
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state's application of the sex offender registration and
notification requirements.
The Circuit Courts of Appeal remain in conflict about what
constitutes punishment and what regulations promote public
safety.
Notably, the Ninth Circuit's decisions in cases
involving sex offender registration and notification are also
inconsistent.
The Ninth Circuit's decisions in Otte,205
Russell,206 and Neal,207 when considered collectively, evidence
the differences in the outcomes of the cases depending on which
Judge authored the decision. Judge Reinhardt, writing for the
majority in Otte,208 established greater protections for released
sex offenders by holding that the Alaska Act violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause. 209 Judge Reinhardt in Otte21O held that
Internet publication of sex offenders' personal information and
the Act's extensive registration requirements were clearly
excessive and thus punitive. Judge O'Scannlon wrote a more
conservative decision in Russell,211 but nevertheless followed
the guidelines set forth in Megan's Law. Lastly, Judge Nelson
wrote the most conservative decision of the three judges by
upholding the application of sex offender registration
requirements in Neal 212 to those who have not been convicted of
sex offenses. Thus, due to the conflicting decisions among the
Circuits, as well as within the Ninth Circuit itself, the line
between when regulations constitute punishment and what
regulations intend to promote public safety remains unclear.
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS OF DOE v. OTTE
In Doe v. Otte,213 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
Alaska's sex offender registration and notification provisions
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States

Dtte, 259 F.3d at 979.
Russell, 124 F.3d at 1081.
207 Neal, 131 F.3d at 818.
208 Otte, 259 F.3d at 979.
209 See infra Part IV.
210 [d.
211 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1087.
212 Neal, 131 F.3d at 818.
213
Dtte, 259 F.3d at 979. When the initial complaint was files, John Doe I chose the
pseudonym "James Rowe." After complaints from an individual named James Rowe,
the court changed the pseudonym to John Doe. [d.
205

206

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss1/5

26

Miles: Sex Offender Registration Statutes

2002] SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION STATUTES

71

Constitution. 214 Specifically, the court focused on the varying
degrees of registration and notification requirements contained
in the statute, especially the provision that allowed the
dissemination of sex offender personal information over the
Internet. The court determined that the statute was excessive
and, thus unconstitutional because it violated the Ex Post
Facto Clause. 215

A. INTENT TEST
The plaintiffs in Doe v. Otte,216 claimed that the Act was
punitive, and therefore, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.
First, the court examined the Act under the intent-effects
test. 217 The intent prong of the test states that if the
legislature's intent is to punish, then the law must be struck
down. 218 If the legislature's intent is not punitive, then the
court must determine if the punitive effects outweigh the
legislative goal of community protection. 219
The court determined that the Alaska legislature's intent
was non-punitive. 220 The court concluded that the placement of
the Act in the criminal code was not necessarily determinative
of the legislature's intent to punish. 221
The court also
considered the legislative findings in concluding that the Act
was non-punitive. 222 Thus, the court moved on to consider the
Mendoza-Martinez factors.223
B. EFFECTS TEST - MENDOZA-MARTINEZ FACTORS

Next, the court used the Mendoza-Martinez test to decide if
the punitive effects of the Act were so egregious that it violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court explicitly did not apply
the clearest proof standard, which is only used when the
legislature's intent IS clearly regulatory, because the
214
215

216
217

218
219
220
221
222

223

Id.
Id. at 982.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 986-88, See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1086.
See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079.
Otte, 259 F.3d at 985-95, citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
Id. at 986-89.
Otte, 259 F.3d at 986.
Id.
Id.
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legislature's intent in this instance was ambiguous. 224 The
court examined the seven criteria set forth in the MendozaMartinez test to determine the extent to which the punitive
effects outweighed any regulatory intent. 225

1. The Act is Punitive if it Results in Affirmative Disability or
Restraint
The court first considered whether the Act imposed an
affirmative disability or restraint on the convicted sex
offender. 226 To find that a sex offender registration and
notification statute imposes an affirmative disability or
restraint, the statute must not impose any more burdens than
necessary to accomplish its goal of community protection. 227
The court closely compared the disabilities and restraints
imposed by the Washington statute in Russell228 with those
imposed by the Act. 229
While both statutes required
registration upon release, the Act's registration requirements
were vastly more burdensome. 23o The Act required released
sex offenders to register four times a year for a minimum of
fifteen years and a maximum of life. 231 In contrast, the
Washington statute only required a one-time registration. 232
The Ninth Circuit held that the Act's registration and
notification provisions imposed significant disabilities on the
convicted sex offender.
The notification provision was
excessive because the posting of the convicted sex offender's
information on the Internet subjects the sex offender and his
family "to community obloquy and scorn that damage them
personally and professionally."233

224 [d. at 985. See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1086. The "clearest proof standard", is a
high standard that is only imposed on the party challenging the statute when the
legislative intent is clearly regulatory. [d.
225
Otte, at 259 F.3d at 986-95. See also Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
226 Otte, 259 F.3d at 987-89.
227 [d.
228 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1079.
229
Otte, 259 F.3d. at 987-89.
230 [d. at 989.
231
See id. Other requirements of Alaska's statue included, appearing in person at
law enforcement agencies and providing home address, work address, vehicle
registration, and disclose the nature of any mental health treatment.
232 [d. at 987.
233

[d.
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Accordingly, the court concluded that the burdensome
registration and notification requirements under the Act
imposed an affirmative disability and restraint. 234 The Act did
not limit the dissemination of information to specific
geographic areas, but rather publicized the convicted sex
offender's information over the Internet. 235 The Act also did
not take into account the sex offender's likelihood of
recidivism. 236 Accordingly, this factor demonstrated that the
statute had a punitive effect because it imposed substantial
disabilities on convicted sex offenders. 237

2. The Act is Punitive if it is Historically Regarded as
Punishment
The court next addressed the issue of whether sex offender
registration acts have historically been regarded as punitive. 238
Because similar statutes have been in place for less than a
decade, the court focused on the decisions of lower courts. 239
Specifically, the court compared the Alaska Act to the
Washington statute,240 and concluded that neither statute was
meant to punish. 241 The court also found that the statutes
were not analogous to historical forms of shaming
punishment. 242 Therefore, this factor favored characterizing
the Act as non-punitive.

234
Otte, 259 F.3d at 987. The Court in Russell upheld the Washington statute
because the law was narrowly tailored to serve the interest of public protection and had
only minimal imposition on the sex offender.
235 [d. at 988.
236

237

[d.
[d. at 989.

238 See id. at 989.
The Court noted that some of the offenses that triggered
application of the Act were "strict liability" offenses that are committed whether or not
the defendant is aware that his conduct is criminal (e.g. statutory rape). [d.
239 See Otte, 259 F.3d at 989, citing Alan R. Kabat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender
Databases and Community Notification; Sacrificing Personal Privacy for a Symbol's
Sake, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 333, 334·55 (1998).
240 Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092.
241
Otte, 259 F.3d at 989.
242 [d. See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092, (acknowledging that there is no historical
antecedent to sex offender registration and notification provision). [d. The closest
analogy to the notification provision is "wanted" posters for dangerous persons. [d.
Although the court states that the notification provisions carry a great risk of
vigilantism, the court maintains that they are not historically regarded as punitive. [d.
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3. The Act is Punitive if it Applies Only upon the Finding of
Scienter
The third issue addressed by the court was whether the
Act comes into play only upon the finding of scienter. The
court noted that the Act's requirements were imposed on those
offenders without knowledge that their actions were a crime,
such as those found mentally incompetent, as well as those who
had the necessary mens rea. 243 Accordingly, because the court
found that application of the Act was not dependent on a
finding of scienter, this factor supported the conclusion that the
Act was not punitive. 244

4. The Act is Punitive if it Promotes Traditional Aims of
Punishment
The court next determined whether the Act specifically
promoted the aims of retribution and deterrence, the
traditional aims of punishment. 245 The court found that the
registration and notification provisions of the Act were
retributive because of the excessive obligations imposed on sex
offenders. 246 These provisions required frequent contact with
the police department over a minimum of fifteen years, and
therefore were excessive. 247
The court again compared the Act to the Washington
statute in Russell248 and found that the Washington statute
"may implicate deterrence," and similarly the Act had its own
deterrent effect.249 Unlike the Washington Statute, the Act's
"onerous" registration obligations were inherently punitive. 250
In reaching this conclusion, the court analogized the
243
244
246
246
247
248
249

Qtte, 259 F.3d at 989.
Id.
Id. at 989-91.
Id. at 990.
Id.
See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082-83.
Qtte, 259 F.3d at 990, See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1091. The Washington statute

required convicted sex offenders to register with local law enforcement authorities and
subjected some to community notification. Id. The statute required registration within
twenty-four hours of release and to notify of change of address. Id. The notification
element required that a public agency must have some evidence of an offender's future
dangerousness or likelihood of recidivism in order to justify disclosure. Id. Further
dissemination was restricted to narrow geographic areas.
260 Qtte, 259 F.3d at 990.
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registration requirements with supervised probation in the
respect that both required regular reports to law enforcement,
and concluded that this supported the conclusion that the
requirements were punitive. 251 The court also noted that the
registration requirements did not differentiate between the
gravity of the offender's initial offense and the potential of risk
to the community.252 Overall, the court found that the Act
furthered the traditional aims of retribution and deterrence.
Therefore, the court determined that this factor also supported
the conclusion that the Act was punitive. 253
5. The Act is Punitive if the Behavior to which the Act Applies is
Already a Crime

Next, the court examined whether the behavior to which
the Act applies was already criminal in nature. 254 Since the
Act applied only to those found guilty, it followed that
imposition of the Act's requirements depended on an actual
conviction. 255
In contrast, the Court noted that the
Washington statute in Russell,256 which the Ninth Circuit
concluded was non-punitive, applied to sex offenders whether
or not they had been convicted. 257 Specifically, the Washington
statute subjected those sex offenders who were incompetent to
stand trial and persons found not guilty by reason of insanity
to its registration and notification requirements. 258
In
contrast, because the Act's requirements were only imposed on
those who had been convicted in a court oflaw and not to those
found not guilty by reason of mental impairment, the court
found this factor demonstrated that the Act was punitive. 259

[d. at 991.
[d. at 990.
253 [d. at 99l.
254 [d.
255 Otte, 259 F.3d at 991.
256 See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082.
257 Otte, 259 F.3d at 991. See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1091. The Ninth Circuit made
frequent reference to the Washington statute and used this as a means of comparison
in analyzing the Alaska Act. [d.
256 See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found the Tenth
Circuit's holding that Utah's Sex Offender Notification Act was not punitive because it
also applied to those offenders found not guilty because of a mental impairment. [d.
259 Otte, 259 F.3d at 991.
251

252
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6. The Act is Punitive Unless the Non-Punitive Purposes
Outweigh the Punitive Effects
The sixth factor the court considered in determining if the
Act was punitive was whether the Act's non-punitive purpose,
that is public safety, outweighed the punitive purpose of the
registration and notification. 260 The court found that the Act
legitimately and reasonably served the non-punitive purpose of
public safety.

7. The Act is Punitive if the Act is Excessive in Relation to
Purpose
Lastly, the court addressed the issue of whether the Act's
registration and notification provisions were excessive in
relation to the public safety interests advanced by the Act. 261
The court stated that the excessiveness factor is the most
telling and significant evidence of whether a statute is
punitive. 262 Sex offender registration and notification statutes
cannot impose requirements that are excessive in relation to
the legislature's intended purpose. 263
Again, the court compared the Act to the Washington
statute and found that the Act was excessive in comparison to
the more narrowly constructed requirements imposed by the
Washington statute. 264
The Alaska legislature made no
attempt to classify sex offenders by degrees to which they posed
future risk, but rather applied a blanket punishment on all
offenders. 265 Notably, a judicial determination of rehabilitation
was irrelevant under the Act. 266 Furthermore, the court found
the statute was "exceedingly broad" because the notification
[d.
[d. at 991·93.
262 [d. at 991.
263 [d. at 991.
264
Dtte, 259 F.3d at 992-93. See also Russell, 124 F.3d at 1082. Specifically the
Washington statute only allowed dissemination of sex offenders' personal information
within a narrow geographic area. [d.
265
Dtte, 259 F.3d at 992. The Court noted that all Federal Court of Appeals have
upheld registration and notification statutes that are tailored to the risk of the sex
offenders with the exception of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Femedeer v. Haun, 227
F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000). In Russell, the court considered "evidence of the offender's
future dangerousness, likelihood of re-offending or threat to community to justify
disclosure to the public."
266 [d.
260
261
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provisions allowed access to information worldwide over the
Internet. 267 The powerlessness of law enforcement authorities
to limit the widespread public distribution of this information
under the Act demonstrates the exceedingly broad nature of
the Act. 26B The court stated that ''broadcasting the information
about all past sex offenders on the Internet does not in any way
limit its dissemination to those whom the particular offender is
of concern."269 Accordingly, the court concluded that under this
factor the Act was punitive. 270
The Court analyzed the Mendoza-Martinez criteria and
found that the Act's effects were excessively punitive in
comparison to any non-punitive intent alleged by the
legislature. In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on
the excessive registration requirements, the fact that the Act
applied only to behavior that was already a crime, the
retributive aspects of the registration requirements and the
imposition of substantial disabilities and restraints on the
offender. 271 Although the Act was not punitive in every respect,
the Act taken as a whole was excessively punitive in relation to
the purpose of community protection. 272 Thus, the court held
that the Act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and was invalid.
In addition to the Ex Post Facto Clause violations, the
plaintiffs raised other constitutional challenges. The plaintiffs
also claimed that the Act violated their Due Process and
privacy rights. 273 The court acknowledged that the Act ''brands
sex offenders without any attempts to classify them by the risk
posed" and denies them an opportunity to prove rehabilitation.
The court strongly suggested that the plaintiffs Due Process
challenges had merit, however, the court declined to address
the Due Process challenge because of its holding that the Act
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.

[d.
[d.
269
Otte, 259 F.3d at 992.
270 [d.
27\
[d. at 993·95.
272 [d.
273 [d. Jane Doe also challenged the Act as violating her right to privacy. [d. The
court found that Jane Doe's privacy claim was taken care of by the finding of the Ex
Post Facto Clause violation. [d.
267
268
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V. CRITIQUE: PROPOSED SOLUTION: SUPERVISED
PROBATION
In Doe v. Otte,274 the Ninth Circuit properly found that the
Alaska Act violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Act's
excessive registration requirements and the unrestrained
ability to post sex offenders' personal information on the
Internet clearly punished sex offenders after the completion of
their original sentences. What began as the regulation of sex
offenders in order to protect our communities, has become a
mechanism that deprives sex offenders, who have completed
their original sentences and others who had been rehabilitated,
of their constitutional rights.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Alaska Act was
enacted as a result of the pending release of a large number of
sex offenders back into the community.275 Thus, the Act's
requirements and notification provisions were the result of a
knee-jerk276 reaction to a "crisis" that was never
substantiated. 277
Such hysteria leads to an overzealous
attempt to ensure public safety, but results in the deprivation
of the constitutional rights of the released sex offenders.
Many factors must be considered in determining the most
appropriate course of action to protect the public from sex
offenders who are likely to reoffend. Once a sex offender
completes his or her sentence, however, he or she should not be
subjected to an excessive and indefinite term of punishment,
which was not previously imposed by the trial court upon
conviction. If an offender continues to pose a severe risk after
being released, then the sentence may have been too light in
the first place.
The Circuits have recognized that the needs of the
community must be balanced with the rights of the released
sex offender. In order to accomplish this goal of community
protection, sex offenders should be subject to a probation-like
term, with definite timelines and guidelines, after completing
their prison sentence. The sex offender should be made aware
274
275

Id.
Id. at 984.

276 Knee-jerk is often associated with "liberals" but in this context is meant to refer
merely to acting on preconceived, unsubstantiated ideas and stereotypes.
277 Otte, 259 F.3d at 984.
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of the requirements for probation upon sentencing in order to
avoid any Ex Post Facto violations. The guidelines and
timelines for probation should be decided by a board of
experienced individuals, such as physicians, psychologists,
social workers and law enforcement upon completion of the sex
offender's initial sentence. The criteria for probation, such as
threat to the community, rehabilitation and likelihood of
recidivism, not the initial crime, should be based on a sliding
scale.
Megan's Law is meant to protect the community against
this group of people. Thus, this great responsibility should not
be put on the shoulders of the community that is ill equipped to
handle this job due to the lack of training and access to
accurate information. A period of probation, under the
supervision and guidance of a trained officer, will place the
burden of protecting communities on law enforcement, rather
than on inexperienced citizens. The terms of supervised
probation should be prospective and based on the sex offender's
threat to the community upon release, the risk of recidivism,
and whether or not the sex offender has been rehabilitated.
Although requiring supervised probation for released sex
offenders who fit into certain designated criteria might
inundate the probation system, this is the best way of ensuring
that those who continue to pose a threat to the community are
supervised in an appropriate manner. Supervised probation is
the only practical way to address public safety concerns.
Supervised probation will address concerns of accountability
through frequent contracts with trained professionals. This
system will enable the released sex offender to obtain
rehabilitative resources, but also violate those offenders who
choose not to abide by the terms of probation. Thus, supervised
probation is also the best way to balance the safety interests of
the public against the rights of the released sex offender.
Internet posting and excessive registration requirements
cannot accomplish the goal of community protection. Internet
posting merely advertises the presence of sex offenders but
does not provide the community with the necessary tools to
protect themselves from released sex offenders who might reoffend. Additionally, requiring the released offender to register
four times a year with law enforcement serves no purpose other
than an address check for those who have been released. Thus,
incarceration followed by supervised probation, only if the
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released sex offender continues to pose a risk, is the best way to
promote public safety. This huge responsibility of monitoring a
group of people who are likely to re-offend should not be left to
the watchful, untrained and unrestrained eyes of the
community.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Otte,278 has brought greater
attention to the real and potential deprivations of liberty
interests under sex offender registration and notification
provisions, especially those who have been rehabilitated or
those who have a very low risk of re-offending. Unlike other
Circuit Courts of Appeal that have reaffirmed state statutes
broadening the provisions of Megan's Law, the Ninth Circuit
reduced a state's ability to violate sex offenders' constitutional
rights through excessively punitive registration and
notification requirements.
Public labeling of sex offenders might be socially effective
because it sell newspapers and gets votes, not because it
actually promotes public safety. While society has a right to be
fearful of any criminal, including sex offenders, the monitoring
of such a complex problem should not be turned over to
untrained communities that are misinformed on recidivism,
and that are more fixated on punishing released sex offenders
than on curing the problem. The focus should be on protecting
the public by using resources to structure a probation-like
system that includes law enforcement supervision, not merely
community supervision.
Constant legal challenges to states' use of sex offender
registration and notification statutes to protect the public, are
important ways of ensuring that those sex offenders who have
been rehabilitated or pose no threat are not subject to these
laws. The community has a right not to be misinformed about
the risks these people pose and the offenders have a right to be
free from a classification as "Mr. Mo Lester" if they pose no
threat to the community and their crime was a minor offense.
Accurate classifications, and appropriate measures such as

278

Otte, 259 F.3d at 979.
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requiring supervised probation of sex offenders, will free up
time and energy expended by law enforcement and allow them
to concentrate on those offenders who pose the greatest threat
to public safety.
Some might argue that the risk sex offenders pose to the
community is so grave that all measures should be taken to get
the word out to the community about released sex offenders.
However, the Ninth Circuit properly found that the Alaska Act
imposed disabilities on registrants that were unnecessary and
excessive in relation to what was necessary to protect the
community and what was intended by the registration and
notification provisions set forth by Congress in Megan's Law.
The United States Supreme Court granted review of the
279
OUe decision on February 19, 2002. While the nationwide
trend is to define what states can do within the parameters of
sex offender registration and notification provisions, the United
States Supreme Court should not overrule OUe. 280 Thus, even
though increased punishment through excessive registration
and notification requirements is politically seductive, the
United States Supreme Court must stand firm in ensuring that
these statutes do not erode the very basis of our Constitution.
Colleen Miles*

279
280

Id.
Id.

*J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, (May 2003). Many thanks to
Crystal Howard, who worked tirelessly on editing this article, and Chris Kroblin, who
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